In years following the regime change in central Europe, many communist successor parties (CSPs) have adopted relatively right-wing economic platforms. This paper explores why, upon entering the game of electoral competition, the CSPs have staked right-wing economic positions -as if trying to alienate the potential electorate among the have-nots of the post-communist transformations. Specifically, I propose that CSPs' economic policy is more representative of the interests of the parties' financial donors, rather than the electorate at large. I test this proposition by analyzing the stance that CSPs take towards signing of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). By attracting foreign investment, BITs change the competitive landscape of a host country in ways that are not always beneficial to the domestic companies, owned by supporters of CSPs. Therefore I expect CSP-controlled governments to be hesitant about signing BITs. The results of the statistical investigation support such a hypothesis, as well as the larger claim of the paper, namely, that the economic policy of the communist successor parties is primarily geared towards representing the interests of their financial supporters.
INTRODUCTION
The countries in central Europe have undergone impressive transformations since the collapse of communism. Today, democracy and market economies define the nations that, twenty years ago, subsisted under totalitarian dictatorships.
Ironically, such achievements were often accomplished by governments, dominated to some degree by the former communists. Their impressive performance as political and economic modernizers has produced a general consensus that the former communists -at least in the new EU countries -have transformed themselves into modern social democratic parties (as they supposedly have done in Hungary, Lithuania and Poland). The ones that failed to achieve such transformation have fallen by the wayside of politics (in the Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia). 1 Nevertheless, important aspects of the ex-communist party transformations remain unexplored, and may hold the answers to pertinent questions about party system formations in the region. For example, there is a commonly held opinion that politically successful CSPs have adopted relatively right-wing economic platforms -sometimes to the right of the former-dissident parties. Various authors have answered this question in different ways -most centering on the ex-communists' electoral motivations. 5 In this article I argue that the electorate-centered explanations alone do not succeed in explaining the rightist economic platforms of the former communist parties. Market reforms of the past several decades have created a sizable group of disaffected voters in the region who are skeptical of the small-government, business-friendly rhetoric. Given proportional voting rules adopted by most central European countries, mobilization of these disaffected voters would be the expected electoral strategy of a "typical"
social-democratic party. Instead the opposite has largely been true -the transformed CSPs have frequently represented the interests of large domestic businesses, sometimes implementing extreme right-wing economic policies.
I propose that the right-wing economic platforms of the former communists have nothing to do with a desire to cater to the perceived needs of the traditional social-democratic electorate. Rather, they are motivated by the objective to create a hospitable business environment for the CSP's financial contributors -companies run by the former managers of state-owned enterprises. The two electoral strategies -catering to the needs of a target voter group versus to the business interests of financial donors -are a frequent source of tension in the intra-party politics of any country. In the case of central Europe's CSP's the question of which strategy to follow might have been easier to answer.
The disenchantment with the established political parties in central Europe seems to stem from the overall difficulties of the transitional period 6 , and does not depend exclusively on the policy choices these parties have adopted in the decades of reforms. 7 Instead, the widespread cynicism towards political parties has deeper roots that are still in need of rigorous academic inquiry. If popular skepticism towards the established parties is only partly determined by the content of their policy platforms, it is conceivable that CSP's downgraded that component of their electoral strategy (catering to the needs of the disaffected segments of the population), as the marginal payoff of such a strategy would be relatively low. In In many countries the flavor of the communist rule had a direct effect on the type of leadership that emerged at the helm of the successor parties following the regime implosion. Ishiyama borrows Huntington's terminology to identify three types of leaders that shaped the transformations of the former communist parties.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

METAMORPHOSES OF THE FORMER COMMUNISTS
The first type, the standpatters, prevailed mainly in the former bureaucraticauthoritarian regimes and in the patrimonial regimes of the former Soviet Union.
Such leaders preferred retaining party organization based on the Marxist-Leninist norms, and had a generally negative outlook on reforms. 12 The democratic reformists emerged in the successors to the nationalaccommodative regimes, and favored rapid transformation of their parties into fully competitive political organizations. In some countries the democratic reformists began the efforts at economic modernization as early as the 1980's, causing frictions with the old guard of their party organizations and in this way learning the basics of political competition. 13 The so-called liberals occupied the middle ground between the standpatters and the reformists. They prevailed in the former patrimonial regimes outside of the former USSR, and favored "controlled" political competition with gradual economic reforms. "Fast economic growth will no longer be for the benefit of a narrow group of people," said Fico addressing a crowd of supporters after the election, "we want a centre or centre-left government that will establish solidarity and reduce the 27 Considering the effect of electoral systems, the CSPs should have in fact adopted policies aimed at mobilizing the numerous poor and the rural voters against the increasing middle-class. At the same time, however, the antecedents of the modern-day leadership did not play a role in the rightist CSP policies in Bulgaria and Romania. In both countries radical reformers did not succeed at replacing party leadership prior to 25 Grigore Pop-Eleches, supra note 7: 24 -25. 26 Secondly, the protest voting of the poor and the rural population in central
Europe seems to reflect a general lack of trust in established political parties, rather than a dislike of specific economic policies. The widespread support for antiestablishment parties in the region (most of which do not espouse leftist rhetoric)
originates from a desire "to punish mainstream elites for their often incompetent and corrupt governing style," rather than loyalty to a certain political platform. 33 What the poor voters might want is not more redistribution or other left-wing economic measures, but a tangible economic improvement, regardless of its ideological prescription.
Such an explanation of voters' sentiments is backed up by some empirical evidence. While in Lithuania, anti-establishment parties have fared extremely well in the last three elections (discussed above), the voters did not favor extreme left political parties that advocated the traditional socialist economic policies. 34 
MEASURING CSP INTENTIONS
The question of politicians' intentions is a notoriously difficult one. Party leaders seldom disclose their true intentions, especially if doing so might jeopardize their electoral chances. In this paper I propose an indirect way to gauge the motivations of the ex-communist reformers: by analyzing their efforts in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI).
There are several reasons that justify this approach. First, attracting FDI has never constituted an official requirement for the accession to the EU, which, Perhaps more importantly, attracting significant amounts of FDI was bound to increase competition and to alter the business environment in the domestic market.
Today there is broad agreement that in the 1990s comparative advantage in central
Europe had shifted to labor-intensive industries 41 and investors have used those countries as platforms for producing labor-intensive goods for Western Europe. 42 By and large, FDI in the new EU members has been concentrated in food, textiles, footwear, wood, chemicals and machine building industries 43 -the sectors that were already densely populated by the formerly state-owned domestic enterprises.
Moreover, foreign-owned enterprises have vastly outperformed domestic firms in the region. 44 The presence of lean-and-mean foreign companies in the domestic market could spell disaster for the less efficient former communist managers and their businesses.
Even if FDI occurred outside of the sectors of the main domestic companies, the increased competition for skilled labor would result in higher production costs for all companies. Likewise, the heavy presence of foreign investors might contribute to changes in the overall business practices (such as incidences of bribegiving and tax evasion) that could in turn adversely affect domestic companies that 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
In this section I specify and estimate two econometric models that verify the empirical accuracy of the hypothesis discussed so far. The exact specification of the models is as follows: 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The estimates generated by the models provide qualified support for the hypothesis of the paper. (The detailed output Akaike criterion 522.86 59 Estimates, significant at aplha = 0.01 are represented by ***; at alpha = 0.05 -by **, and at alpha = 0.1 -by *. 
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